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Summary
Claims of US patent, US 6,978,304 US 7,634,571 and US 7,958,237, in
the name of Helios Software were found to be patent eligible subject matter
under 35 USC 101 because allegations that features where principles fundamental
to the ubiquitous use of the internet were not supported, and the claims
included meaningful limitations, which could not be performed by a human alone.
Broad description of the invention
The'304 and '571 Patents relate to
remotely monitoring data associated with an Internet session, and the '237
Patent relates to controlling computer network access.
Characteristic Claim
Claim 1 of US ‘304 is:
A method of remotely monitoring an
exchange of data between a local computer and a remote computer during an
Internet session over the Internet, the method comprising the steps of:
(a)
storing
at a local computer an Internet server address and port number of a monitor
computer;
(b)
initiating
a first Internet session between the local computer and a remote computer via
the Internet;
(c)
storing
at the local computer data associated with the first Internet session;
(d)
retrieving
the Internet server address and port number stored at the local computer;
(e)
initiating
concurrent with the first Internet session a second Internet session between
the local computer and the monitor computer at the retrieved Internet server
address and port number;
(f)
transmitting
from the monitor computer to the local computer at least one of another
Internet server address and another port number;
(g)
terminating
the second Internet session;
(h)
initiating
concurrent with the first Internet session a third Internet session between the
local computer and the monitor computer using the other Internet server address
and/or the other port number; and
(i)
transferring
from the local computer to the monitor computer via the third Internet session
the stored data associated with the first Internet session.
Details
The defendant, SpectorSoft argues that the patents US
6,978,304 and US 7,634,571 by Helios Software are patent-ineligible because
they are directed to an abstract idea. Plaintiffs, including Helios Software,
counter that the patents are directed to patent-eligible processes that satisfy
the machine or transformation test.
SpectorSoft argues that the
inventions are "basic concepts" that were "well-understood and
routine" and that performing these "well-understood, routine and
generic computer functions . . . fails to circumvent the prohibition against
patenting abstract ideas." (D.I. 376 at 23) The Court disagrees.
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101,
"[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title." There are three exceptions to § 101's broad
patent-eligibility principles: "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas." Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). Pertinent here is the third
category. "The `abstract ideas' category embodies the longstanding rule
that an idea of itself is not patentable. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank
Int'l, 134 S. Ct.
2347, 2355 (2014). "As early as Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852), the Supreme Court explained that
`[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a
motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an
exclusive right.' Since then, the unpatentable nature of abstract ideas has
repeatedly been confirmed." In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 977-78 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
In Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012), the Supreme Court set out a two-step
"framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. First, courts must determine if
the claims at issue are directed at a patent-ineligible concept. See id.
If so, the next step is to look for an "'inventive concept' — i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent
in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself" Id.
"Simply appending conventional
steps, specified at a high level of generality, [is] not enough to
supply an inventive concept." Id. at 2357 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis in original). In Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010), for example, the Supreme Court held
that the claims involved were drawn to the patent-ineligible abstract idea of
"hedging, or protecting against risk," which was a "fundamental
economic practice." Similarly, in Alice, the Supreme Court found
that the claims were drawn to the patent-ineligible abstract idea of
"intermediated settlement," which was also a "fundamental
economic practice." 134 S. Ct. at 2356. In both cases, the Supreme Court
found that the additional steps delineated in the claims did not embody an
"inventive concept" sufficient to ensure that the patents amounted to
something more than a legalized monopoly on the practice of the ineligible
fundamental concepts themselves.
In determining if a patent embodies
such an inventive concept, courts may consider whether the process "is
tied to a particular machine or apparatus" or "transforms a
particular article into a different state or thing." Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 ("[T]he
machine-or-transformation test is a useful and important clue, an investigative
tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes under §
101."). "[T]o impart patent-eligibility to an otherwise unpatentable
process under the theory that the process is linked to a machine, the use of
the machine must impose meaningful limits on the claim's scope." CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decision, Inc., 654
F.3d 1366, 1375 (internal quotation marks omitted). To be "a meaningful limit on
the scope of a claim," the addition of a machine "must play a
significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than
function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be
achieved more quickly." SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 601 F.3d
1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Hence, the "mere recitation of a generic computer cannot
transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358. "Given the ubiquity of
computers, wholly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of
additional feature that provides any practical assurance that the process is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the abstract idea
itself." Id.
Although the "machine-or
transformation test is a useful and important clue" to determining patentability,
it is "not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a
patenteligible 'process.'" Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227. "[I]n applying the § 101
exception, [courts] must distinguish between patents that claim the building
blocks of human ingenuity and those that integrate the building blocks into
something more thereby transforming them into a patenteligible invention."
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (internal citations omitted). The
"concern that drives the exclusionary principle [i]s one of
pre-emption." Id. That is, where a "patent would pre-empt use
of basic tools of scientific and technological work, i.e., laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, the patent would "impede innovation
more than it would tend to promote it, thereby thwarting the primary object of the
patent laws." Id.
Here, the patents-in-suit are drawn
to remotely monitoring data associated with an Internet session and controlling
network access. SpectorSoft makes no effort to show that these ideas are
fundamental truths or fundamental principles the patenting of which would
pre-empt the use of basic tools of scientific and technological work. Although
"remotely monitoring data associated with an Internet session" or
"controlling network access" may be principles fundamental to the
ubiquitous use of the Internet or computers generally, SpectorSoft has provided
no support for that position. As such, the Court cannot agree with SpectorSoft
that the patents-in-suit are drawn to an abstract idea.
Additionally, even if the asserted
claims were drawn to abstract ideas, the claims would remain patentable because
they satisfy the machine-or-transformation test. The implementation of the '304
Patent by a computer inserts meaningful limitations by claiming exchanging data
over different internet sessions to capture the content of an ongoing Internet
communication session. (`304 Patent 1:28-34) Similarly, the '571 Patent claims
real-time data capture and transmission and reception, thereby using a computer
to "play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be
performed." Finally, the '237 Patent involves the ability to provide
access configurations and communication protocols that control computer network
access and monitor activity. (`237 Patent 1:54-2:3) These meaningful
limitations limit the scope of the patented invention and sufficiently tie the
claimed method to a machine. Importantly, both sides concede that none of these
limitations could be performed by a human alone. (D.I. 376 at 23; D.I. 342 at
20) Accordingly, the Court finds that the patents-in-suit are not drawn to
patent-ineligible subject matter. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
regarding SpectorSoft's affirmative defense of lack of patentable subject
matter is granted.